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THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT*
There is a magic in words which the human race seems almost
always to have felt. The words for holy things and the words for
intimate things, such as family relationships, have in particular
enjoyed an unusually strong sentimental reverence. More than one
religion has preserved its truths in a language which long ago ceased
to be currently used, and in several quarters of the globe at the
present day living languages are defended with fierce devotion as
symbols of racial or local independence, while dead tongues are
resurrected to a new life of struggle in the same compelling cause.
With the growth of enquiry into human history, however, the sense
of magic and the force of sentiment give place to a somewhat different
feeling. It is admitted that words have changed in form, although
remaining fundamentally the same in spite of it; the stable element
in the word is now regarded as particularly connected with the idea
which the word represents, and the changes merely show the persistence of that idea through the chances of the centuries. Hence
arises an interest in the history of words which is to be found all
through history from at least the classical times. Of course the somewhat uncritical use of history which was the rule until recently, and
the absence of a science of philology reduced the process to something like guesswork, which was moreover employed too frequently
in the maintenance of controversy, the decoration of treatises with
learned ornament, or some other extraneous end. Lord Lochee
long ago remarked that "one of the pre-historical ways of philosophising about law was to account for what wanted explanation by some
theory about the origin of technical words. This implied some
previous study of words and their history, and is an instance of the
deepseated and persistent tendency of the human mind to identify
names with the things they represent. The Institutes of Justinian
abound in explanations founded on a supposed derivation of some
leading term."' In the hands of an unskilful student, this method
almost inevitably results in attributing the contemporary significance
*Assistant Professor of Legal History, Harvard Law School.
1

Article on "Jurisprudence" 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (iith ed. 1911)

578a.

CORATELL LAW QUARTERLY
of a word to its real or supposed historical ancestors, and assuming
that this idea is immemorially old because a particular root, with
which it is thus arbitrarily connected, is clearly of an ancient date.
Nor were Justinian and his commissioners at all unique in their use
of linguistic history as an aid to the elucidation of law; our own Coke
developed a fantastic philology all his own as part of his institutional
teaching.
With the nineteenth century we come to the influence of Darwin,
"the greatest historian of modem times," and instead of the preoccupation of earlier ages with the persistence unchanged of ideas and
institutions, we find the scholar admitting that change has been
almost always an inevitable factor in history. Thus emancipated,
philological enquiry was relieved of the necessity of reaching edifying
results, while about the same date the study of Sanscrit revealed a new
world of philological material.
To the philologists of the early and middle nineteenth century,
legal history and legal science owe an immense debt. Organic connections were discovered between languages which superficially and
geographically seemed widely separated. The study of comparative
philology rapidly grew up, and immediately began to extend its
boundaries far beyond the study of language. Investigation of
certain words of primary importance had compelled the philologist
to study the institutions which they represented, and so we find that
the expert in linguistics discovered many things of the highest importance concerning such topics as property, contract, procedure,
succession, marriage, and so forth. Finally, out of these broad
territories first explored by the philologist, there has now been
carved out a generous appanage for the lawyer. It is with good
reason that Vinogradoff dedicated the second volume of his Historical
Jurisprudenceto Dareste, who is one of the notable band of scholars
who combine philology with legal pre-history; in fact, Vinogradoff
was prepared to assert that "the immediate incitement for the formation of comparative jurisprudence was given by the great discoveries of comparative philology." 2 The separation was completed
when India reappeared in the story: having started the cycle with its
capital contribution of Sanscrit, it completed it by furnishing Sir
Henry Maine with the accumulated treasures of its tribal law and
customs. Comparative jurisprudence, then, like its big brother,
comparative philology, is under a peculiar debt to India.
So far, the study of language has shed most light upon matters of
pre-history. There can be no doubt, however, that the services of
2
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philology may very well extend beyond that shadowy and contentious kingdom, and be fruitfully employed in the less speculative
realm of strict history. Our own common law has an uninterrupted
history of thirteen centuries for which written sources are available,
and there is ample room for linguistic development in so long a
period. The terminology in every day use by the Anglo-American
lawyer is drawn from a variety of sources and has undergone a
variety of transformations together with the legal concepts which it
denotes, and in the history of these transformations there are valuable clues to the more general topic of legal history.
Within the last year there was issued the last part of the monumental Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (,8971928.) This immense and fascinating work provides the scholar
with a summary history of every word in the language, with excerpts from the sources. Lawyers will find within these heavy folios a
carefully compiled series of extracts relating to any word they choose,
arranged in chronological order, with an analysis of the meanings
and a summary of the ancestry of the word and the changes in its
form. The amount of material there available is enormous; but it is
not exhaustive. The compilers were- not particularly interested in
legal matters, and most unfortunately did not use the Year Books in
searching for specimens. Consequently there are some gaps. But
even where they have the material, it is obvious that they did not
have the space for any extended discussion of the questions which
interest the lawyer most-namely, the relation between changes in a
particular word and changes in the law. Investigators of special
subjects have therefore been at the pains of compiling for themselves the history of the technical terminology involved where this is
necessary, as is generally the case. In this way quite a fair aniount
of work has been done, although it is scattered among countless
books and articles and so is more or less inaccessible. A recent
French scholar has made a plea for the systematic study of what
may be called "Legal Semantic" in connection with early legal
history, and there is every reason to believe that there is room for
its extension to historical ages as well.3 In Germany, where a large
number of local jurisdictions existed until fairly recently, it has been
possible to create a geography of legal languages. 4 In Italy, on
3
Mauss, Questions de Sbmantique comparge de Mots concernantles Institutions et
la Morale (1928) 7 REvuE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANgAIS ET PITRANGER 331333.
4
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the other hand, a curious incident in the University of Rome serves
as warning that the relations of philologist and jurist may sometimes
be very strained) In this country where academic life is less exciting
there is every reason to believe that the two sciences could work
together in amity if only they could be brought into contact with
one another. Without making any extended searches it has proved
possible to name several studies along these lines which deservethe
careful attention of all who are interested in the history of law.
Some of these are particularly interesting because they show the
commerce in words between several different sciences. An admirable
example is the recent study by Judge Dowdall, K. C., of the history
of the word "Person." 6 Beginning as a mask worn by actors and
serving to amplify the voice and accentuate the features, it passed
into Roman law where it served at first as a word for those various
types which were of constant recurrence (like the types of character
on the stage). Some types were higher than others; slaves had no
persona, as it were. But the word was still hardly a term of art. In
the Byzantine empire it began to acquire some precision, however,
and it may be that it came back to the west by way of Sicily, for
by the thirteenth century it could be used of a corporation. Here,
be it noted, Judge Dowdall finds that the history of the word persona
is not quite in accordance with the speculations of Gierke. Not
until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries does the word assume
its modem significance in law. Meanwhile there had been great play
with the word persona and 7rp 6rcoirov (which was regarded conventionally as the Greek equivalent) among the theologians and
philosophers from the patristic age down to the present day. ,
Words and phrases not infrequently serve as a veil which obscures
the processes which go on behind it, and the historian must not only
pierce the veil in order to discover what those processes were, but
must also reckon with it as one of the factors which permitted or even
facilitated the introduction of new elements. A remarkable example
of the constant reading of new meanings into time honored formulas
5

The controversy is between Professors Carusi and Nallino both of the University of Rome, and involves numerous points of Arabic language and Mohammedan
law; see Carusi's very lively book DIRrTro E FInOLOGIA: RIT1OSTA DI UN GIURISTA
ALLE CRITICHE DI UN FILOLOGO (1925). A learned criticism of the controversy
willbefound inthereview of Carusi's work in (1927) 47 ZEITSCHRIF DER SAVIGNYSTIFTUNG (ROMANiSTISCHE ABTEILUNG) 446-455.
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is to be found in the development of the theory of the Papacy.7
Even quite modem words, however, need historical treatment if
their use is to be freed from latent misconceptions. "Capitalism,"
for example, comes from the year i85o and already has provided
matter for a substantial study.$
Political terms are all the more susceptible of curious changes
since innovation is bound to come, and conservatives are easiest
placated by using old words, although with new meanings. "Wonderful conjuring tricks with a crown or a basket (fiscus) may yet be
played by deft lawyers" as Maitland has said,9 and it will require
equally deft work by the historian of words if their evolutions are to
be thoroughly understood. The curious suggestion has been made
that the word "public looks much like a Respublica which, to spare
the feelings of 'a certain great personage,' has dropped its first syllable." Eighteenth century statutes do not hesitate to state that
"the public stands indebted" to the East Indian Company in the
sum of four millions odd.10
Few words are more interesting than the group "State," "status,"
and "estate." The early sense of status seems to have been that
which we now have appropriated to the Latin form of the word, that
is to say, the condition of a person in the eyes of the law. In the
Middle Ages this meaning spread to include such vague notions as
we now describe as social classes, whether they had precise legal
attributes or not. Then by a natural specialisation, this came to
mean more particularly the higher and more important classes, and
hence homo qui statum habuit means a person of high rank, and finally
a ruler, or a body of rulers. Hence we read of "Their Highnesses
the States of the United Provinces" in Holland. Such potentates
have their powers geographically limited, and so "state" acquires a
territorial significance, especially in Italy where the ancient use
7
Caspar, Primatus Petri: eine philologisch-historische Untersuchung -aber die
Ursprange der Primatslehre (1927) 47 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG
(KANONISTISCHE ABTEILUNG) 253-331.
8
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The word "capital" on the other hand is quite old and has a long and complicated history which lies mainly in the field of economics rather than law. See
Cannan, Early History of the Term Capital (1921) 35 Q. J. OF Eco. 469-481 and the
supplementary note Richards, Early History of the Term Capital (1926) 40 ibid.
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of the word for a feudal residence, or even for property in general,
may have helped the transition. This feudal connection is of interest
for it perpetuated the medieval idea of feudal dignities within the
Empire as being technically offices; "the State, at least eo nomine,
arises within the Empire, where the theory long survived that all
government, except that of the Empire itself, was however effectively
sovereign, an office held from the Emperor. It is significant therefore to observe that the words 6tat, state, and estate were never used,
as stato and staat were and are, for a Landschaft; and that status and
stato were applied to the position of a prince or bishop, but not lo
that of the Emperor or Pope." In the hands of Machiavelli the word,
as well as the idea underwent a notable change: "a word was wanted
for the kingdom of a king, the duchy of a duke, the county of a
unmittelbar count, the dominium of an independent lord, and the
government of a free city-in fact, for every form of government
which exercises imperio sopra gli uomini. Machiavelli, by the same
stroke, decisively selected, and defined, and proclaimed, the appropriate word; and by explicitly recognizing and naming a general
concept suitable for scientific purposes he rendered possible, and
indeed himself founded, the modem science of the State." So far,
the state was the governor; the last transformation is the inclusion
of the governed as well. "L'Etat, c'est moi" would have been a
pointless truism if it had been uttered in the days of Machiavelli;
by the close of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the
eighteenth, however, the change begins to appear which will give
point to the epigram, and confer upon the word "state" the meaning
which is now its principal signification."
This is by no means the whole of the story, although the rest is
shorter told. "Estates of the Realm" have been the subject of
learned controversy, and the English use or misuse of the words has
been described by Sir Frederick Pollock.12 Lawyers in England
have appropriated the word for a peculiar conception of their own,
and thereby have developed the idea of an "estate" in land (which
in popular use has come to be transferred to the land itself, thus
reaching the same position as the old Italian stato but by a different
route). For the history of this aspect of the word we have the valuable discoveries of Jofion des Longrais, whose study La Conception
"This is sunimarised from the most interesting article of Judge Dowdall,
TM Word "State" (1923) 39 L. Q. REV. 98 where he refers to the previous literattre of the subject and dissents from the theory of JELLINEx, ALLGEMEINE
STAATSLEHRE (3d ed. 1921).
12POLLOCK, TABLE TALE: OF JOHN SELDEN (1927) 150.
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Anglaise de la Saisine du XIIe au XIVe SiMce (1925) is indispensable
13
for a thorough understanding of the history of real property law.
It seems that Bracton does not use the term to mean "an estate"
in land in the modem use of the word; with him status means chiefly
the condition of freedom or serfdom. But there does appear in his
treatise a phrase statum mutare several times repeated in connection
with transactions dealing with land. It is clear from the context
(as des Longrais observes) that status here refers to the person rather
than to the land. The nearest modem equivalent is perhaps the
familiar "change of position;" thus a donor who remained in seisin
after the alleged gift numquam exivit a seysina, nec statum mutavit in
aliquo--"nevergave up seisin, nor changed his position in any way."
This is undoubtedly the sense in Bracton's mind, but as the author
acutely observes, "half a century later the word status in this same
phrase would certainly be taken (by an easy transition) in the real or
abstract sense: "he did not give up seisin nor change the nature of his
estate."' 4 In the course of time, the vague word "estate" acquires
some degree of precision, and so a new term "interest" is employed
to carry the vague sense which once belonged to "estate." To
the foreign observer there is something significant of English legal
thought in this process: "like the word 'estate,' the word 'interest' in
use later, will be one of those broad, practical terms whose use seems
indispensable to jurists across the Channel. As we shall see, the
word 'seisin' for a moment played the same role in the past."' 5 The
English taste for ill-defined terms is surely reflected in the extremes
of bizarrerieto which a common lawyer will go, if once he yields to
the urge to create a really exact terminology. Recent years have
seen some truly fearful and wonderful productions of this sort.
In the more special field of the common law, the references to the
history of technical terms are few, and mainly to be found in a few
books. The language of the real property lawyer has been carefully studied by Jofton des Longrais, and he has embodied in his
work the suggestions of Pollock and Maitland. The "use" has been
definitely traced by the latter to the Latin opus rather than to usus,
13Pages 81 to 205 of Jofion des Longrais are an exhaustive examination of
English legal terminology so far as it applies to real-property; the study of both
normal and Bractonian terms and the distinction between the two is of the
essence of the author's thesis.
1JofioN DES LONGRAIS, op. cit. supra, at 127 n.4.
5JOfOON DES LONGRAIS, op. cit. supra, at 129.
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a fact of significance.16 "Owe" and "own" have been disentangled;
and may perhaps be paralleled by the curious use of "duty" in the
sense of a debt; 18 "attach" has been historically treated and cleared
of a serious misconception; 19 the short career of "epike" has also
been learnedly treated;20 the present writer has raised questions
about "lease" which have not yet been answered; 21 the word "parliament" has been traced back to a time when it could be used of a
disorderly or unlawful assembly.2 As late as 1267 Henry III forbade
parliaments, conventicles or congregations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.2? Malice aforethought has also been referred to
a curious original, 24 and so for that matter, have a number of terms
25
in criminal law, such as "forestall."
By way of concluding this list of examples, we shall refer very
briefly to a word whose history- seems to have escaped attention,
namely "bailiff" and "bailee." The principal meaning of "bailiff'"
in English documents is the familiar agent of the lord of the manor
who has the general management of the estate. The- principal
descriptions of his duties are to be found in Walter of Henley and
Fleta. 26 A recent writer,2 7 however, has thrown doubt upon their
veracity, especially as to the bailiff, by confronting them with the
evidence of the surviving rolls and accounts of many manors: "It is
162 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1911)

228-229,

233-239. It is curious to note that the change from opus to the English "use"
was a bit confusing to contemporaries; occasionally we find that the derivation is
reversed and that a writer who wishes to employ the word "use" in the sense of
"usage, custom." will be tempted to put into it a p which ought not to be there"great-great-grandfather is made cousin in Chancery according to their usage
(par
lour oeps)" Y. B. Mich. i9Edw. III, pl. 15, p. 333 (1345) Rolls Series.
7
' "We cannot rethink the process which lies hidden away in the history of
those two words owe and own." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. Supra, note
i6, at 178.
18
In a text of 1461-1483 we read "the claymor shall have execucyoun to levee
the dwtie;" I BATESON, BOROUGH CUSTOMS (1904) 195. (Cf. ibid., at 208).
19Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927) 56, iox.
20
See chapter on "The Transformation of Equity." POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN
LEGAL HISTORY (Vinogradoff's ed. 1913) 286.
214 BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH (1927) 186-187.
22
Richardson, The Originsof Parliament(1928) 4 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL

HIST.
Soc. (4 th Series) 137.
23
Richardson, ibid., at 147.
2i MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS (1911) 304.
supra note
252 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op.

16, at 469 n.i.
(Lamond's ed. 189o); FLETA SEU COMMENTARIUS JURIS ANGLICANI (Selden's ed. 1647).
2
Bennett, The Reeve and the Manor in the Fourteenth Century (1926) 41 ENG.
cit.
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the overwhelming influence exerted by Fleta and other treatises
which has confused our knowledge of the actual working arrangements of the mediaeval manor, giving us a Utopian rather than a real
version. ' ' 28 As against the bailiff, Mr. Bennett would set up the
reeve as the more important officer for practical purposes. These
are serious charges to bring against a group of writers who have hitherto enjoyed considerable esteem, and we think that they are open to
several answers. In the first place, these ancient authors are interested in the scientific management of big businesses, and like modem
writers of the same subject they describe the most elaborateorganisations of their day; they do not pretend to give us a picture of the
average small concern. Then too, there is other evidence available
which confirms the statements of Walter and Fleta. A short experience of the Year Books will show that the bailiff has a definite standing in the law courts, and indeed he figures very frequently in particular forms of action, and above all in the assize of novel disseisin.
It is a striking feature of the bailiff's position that he can answer
such an assize by pleading the general issue without his lord, The
appearance of the bailiff is a sufficient answer to a writ directed
against the lord. This is derived no doubt from the age when the
position of the bailiff was at its highest. Later, it seems that bailiffs
ad hoc could be appointed; for example if an assize of novel disseisin is
brought against a man and wife, it was the common procedure for
the man to answer on his own behalf, aiid as the bailiff of the wife.
On the other hand, a bailiff was subject to very stringent laws on
the matter of his accountability to the lord. Account seems to be due
as an outcome of the relationship of lord to bailiff, and by statute a
lord could assign auditors to his bailiff or other such accountant and
if he is found to be in arrears the auditors were given power to
29
commit him immediately to prison.
As the middle ages proceed more and more people are admitted
into the category of bailiffs, and a case of the reign of Richard II
curiously illustrates the tendency.30 Here we read that a wine dealer
deposited wines in a house which he let to the defendant who was a
taverner; the dealer then brought a writ of account against the taverner as "bailiff" of the wines. Finally an issue was reached on the
question whether the defendant had assented to this bailment which
had been made in fact not to him but to his wife who was a merchant
28

Bennett, ibid., at 359.

29

II (13 Edw. I) c. I (1285).
Selby v. Palfrayman, Y. B. 13 Rich. II. 79 (1389).
press and will be published shortly.
WESTMINSTER
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in her own right. On reading the French text of this case, it looks
very much as though the word "bailiff" is on the point of turning
Both words indeed have the same fundamental idea
into "bailee."
of one person being placed in control of another's property. More
curiously still there is the parallel in the legal position of the bailiff
and the bailee. The bailee who is dispossessed has the same remedy
as his bailor: the bailiff, however, is not to be regarded as seised and
so cannot be plaintiff in a novel disseisin, but he can answer in defence
of his lord's title and plead to the assize, and this without being
furnished with explicit authority such as a power of attorney. The
bailiff's importance steadily declines while that of the bailee correspondingly grows. The word "bailee" seems to appear first in 1528
when it is spelt as often as not "baily"-a very frequent form of
Bailiff (cf. "Old Bailey").-where it is used of the indifferent person
to whom a deed was delivered in escrow pending the performance of
certain conditions." In later days, the bailee will most frequently
be a carrier, and it is carriers who have provided the occasion for
most of the law relating to bailees. This is a point to which we shall
refer later. Meanwhile the growing importance of the bailee canbe
seen in a very significant case of uncertain date (probably Henry
VII, 1485-31509) where it was held necessary to say that the defendant
was bailiff, but that this was not traversable. In other words, the
only wNay of getting an account from32a bailee of goods was to charge"
him as a fictitious bailiff of a manor.
If we look abroad we shall find that the word has had various
fortunes. If in England it has had the queer chance to be applied
to the release of a prisoner upon security (he being bailed to the
bailees who were responsible for his appearance), in France it came
to be the general word for a lease. But most curious of all, if the
word is traced to its remote origins in low Latin we find that it comes
from bajulivus, an adjective formed from bajulus, which means a
carrier. So the story begins as it ends, with the carrier, although for
a long interval the ballivus might carry responsibility rather than
merchandise, and might be the bailiff of a liberty or the balio of a
principality.
It would be possible with some searching to collect many more instances of the part which words have played in the history of legal
ideas. All that we shall do here is to urge that the study is of great
81"Et aprez le bayle deliuer le obligation a cesty a q' fuit fait."
PERUTILis TRACTATUS (Ist ed. 1528).

PERKINS,
The translation of i642 used by the

Oxford
English Dictionary renders "bayle" (doubtless a dissyllable) by "baily."
32Keilway 114.

WORDS

273

interest in itself, and often of value for its side-lights on legal history.
Perhaps in some distant future there may be written a legal dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionaryis a magnificent beginning, and
the Institute of Historical Research in Longdon University is doing
most useful work in continuing it, but the responsibility rests mainly with lawyers. Less learned professions (according to common
repute) have already furnished themselves with historical dictionaries of their technical words. The drapery trade has long had
an excellent dictionary of its terminology on historical and archaeological principles; gypsy-talk and tinkers' cant are the subject of a
special literature; a certain Glossarium Eroticum is now in a welldeserved second edition; but when shall we get a real Law Dictionary
on Historical Principles?

